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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-1950
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AMERICAN DREDGING COMPANY, PETITIONER v.
WILLIAM ROBERT MILLER
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court
of louisiana
[February 23, 1994]

  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
  This case presents the question whether, in admiralty
cases filed in a state court under the Jones Act, 46
U. S. C. App. 688, and the -saving to suitors clause,-
28 U. S. C. 1333(1), federal law pre-empts state law
regarding the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

                      I
  Respondent William Robert Miller, a resident of
Mississippi, moved to Pennsylvania to seek employment
in 1987.  He was hired by petitioner American Dredging
Company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal
place of business in New Jersey, to work as a seaman
aboard the M/V John R., a tug operating on the Dela-
ware River.  In the course of that employment respond-
ent was injured.  After receiving medical treatment in
Pennsylvania and New York, he returned to Mississippi
where he continued to be treated by local physicians.
  On December 1, 1989, respondent filed this action in
the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans,
Louisiana.  He sought relief under the Jones Act, which
authorizes a seaman who suffers personal injury -in the
course of his employment- to bring -an action for
damages at law,- 46 U. S. C. App. 688(a), and over

which state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdic-
tion.  See Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 37 (1926).
Respondent also requested relief under general maritime
law for unseaworthiness, for wages, and for maintenance
and cure.  See McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
357 U. S. 221, 224 (1958) (setting forth means of
recovery available to injured seaman).
  The trial court granted petitioner's motion to dismiss
the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
holding that it was bound to apply that doctrine by
federal maritime law.  The Louisiana Court of Appeal
for the Fourth District affirmed.  580 So. 2d 1091
(1991).  The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed,
holding that Article 123(C) of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure, which renders the doctrine of forum non
conveniens unavailable in Jones Act and maritime law
cases brought in Louisiana state courts, is not pre-
empted by federal maritime law.  595 So. 2d 615 (1992).
American Dredging Company filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari, which we granted.  507 U. S. ___ (1993).


                     II
  The Constitution provides that the federal judicial
power -shall extend . . . to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction.-  U. S. Const. Art. III, 2, cl. 1.
Federal-court jurisdiction over such cases, however, has
never been entirely exclusive.  The Judiciary Act of 1789
provided:
-That the district courts shall have, exclusively of
the courts of the several States . . . exclusive
original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction . . . within their respective
districts as well as upon the high seas; saving to
suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law
remedy, where the common law is competent to give
it.-  9, 1 Stat. 76-77 (emphasis added).
The emphasized language is known as the -saving to
suitors clause.-  This provision has its modern expres-
sion at 28 U. S. C. 1333(1), which reads (with empha-
sis added):
     -The district courts shall have original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of:
     -(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime juris-
diction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.-
We have held it to be the consequence of exclusive
federal jurisdiction that state courts -may not provide a
remedy in rem for any cause of action within the
admiralty jurisdiction.-  Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit
Co., 264 U. S. 109, 124 (1924).  An in rem suit against
a vessel is, we have said, distinctively an admiralty
proceeding, and is hence within the exclusive province of
the federal courts.  The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 431
(1867).  In exercising in personam jurisdiction, however,
a state court may -`adopt such remedies, and . . . attach
to them such incidents, as it sees fit' so long as it does
not attempt to make changes in the `substantive mari-
time law.'-  Madruga v. Superior Court of California,
346 U. S. 556, 561 (1954) (quoting Red Cross Line,
supra, at 124).  That proviso is violated when the state
remedy -works material prejudice to the characteristic
features of the general maritime law or interferes with
the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its
international and interstate relations.-  Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 216 (1917).  The issue
before us here is whether the doctrine of forum non
conveniens is either a -characteristic feature- of admir-
alty or a doctrine whose uniform application is necessary
to maintain the -proper harmony- of maritime law.  We
think it is neither.

                      A
  Under the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens,
-when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear [a]
case, and when trial in the chosen forum would `estab-
lish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . .
out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience,' or when
the `chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of consider-
ations affecting the court's own administrative and legal
problems,' the court may, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, dismiss the case,- even if jurisdiction and
proper venue are established.  Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U. S. 235, 241 (1981) (quoting Koster v.
(American) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U. S.
518, 524 (1947)).  In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S.
501 (1947), Justice Jackson described some of the
multifarious factors relevant to the forum non conveniens
determination:
-An interest to be considered, and the one likely to
be most pressed, is the private interest of the
litigant.  Important considerations are the relative
ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and
the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, wit-
nesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would
be appropriate to the action; and all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive.  There may also be questions as to
the enforcibility [sic] of a judgment if one is ob-
tained. . . .
     -Factors of public interest also have [a] place in
applying the doctrine.  Administrative difficulties
follow for courts when litigation is piled up in
congested centers instead of being handled at its
origin.  Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be
imposed upon the people of a community which has
no relation to the litigation.  In cases which touch
the affairs of many persons, there is reason for
holding the trial in their view and reach rather than
in remote parts of the country where they can learn
of it by report only.  There is a local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home.
There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial
of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with
the state law that must govern the case, rather than
having a court in some other forum untangle
problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to
itself.-  Id., at 508-509.
  Although the origins of the doctrine in Anglo-American
law are murky, most authorities agree that forum non
conveniens had its earliest expression not in admiralty
but in Scottish estate cases.  See Macmaster v.
Macmaster, 11 Sess. Cas. 685, 687 (No. 280) (2d Div.
Scot.) (1833); McMorine v. Cowie, 7 Sess. Cas. (2d ser.)
270, 272 (No. 48) (1st Div. Scot.) (1845); La Soci-t- du
Gaz de Paris v. La Soci-t- Anonyme de Navigation -Les
Armateurs Fran-ais,- [1926] Sess. Cas. (H. L.) 13 (1925).
See generally Speck, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice
of Law in Admiralty: Time for an Overhaul, 18 J. Mar.
Law & Com. 185, 187 (1987); Barrett, The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Cal. L. Rev. 380, 386-387
(1947); Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60
Harv. L. Rev. 908, 909 (1947); but see Dainow, The
Inappropriate Forum, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 867, 881, n. 58
(1935) (doctrine in Scotland was -borrowed- from
elsewhere before middle of 19th century).
  Even within the United States alone, there is no basis
for regarding forum non conveniens as a doctrine that
originated in admiralty.  To be sure, within federal
courts it may have been given its earliest and most
frequent expression in admiralty cases.  See The Maggie
Hammond, 9 Wall. 435, 457 (1870); The Belgenland, 114
U. S. 355, 365-366 (1885).  But the doctrine's applica-
tion has not been unique to admiralty.  When the Court
held, in Gilbert, supra, that forum non conveniens
applied to all federal diversity cases, Justice Black's
dissent argued that the doctrine had been applied in
maritime cases -[f]or reasons peculiar to the special
problems of admiralty.-  Id., at 513.  The Court dis-
agreed, reciting a long history of valid application of the
doctrine by state courts, both at law and in equity.  Id.,
at 504-505, and n. 4.  It observed that the problem of
plaintiffs' misusing venue to the inconvenience of
defendants -is a very old one affecting the administra-
tion of the courts as well as the rights of litigants, and
both in England and in this country the common law
worked out techniques and criteria for dealing with it.-
Id., at 507.  Our most recent opinion dealing with forum
non conveniens, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U. S.
235 (1981), recognized that the doctrine -originated in
Scotland, and became part of the common law of many
States,- id., at 248, n. 13 (citation omitted), and treated
the forum non conveniens analysis of Canada Malting
Co. v. Paterson S. S., Ltd., 285 U. S. 413 (1932), an
admiralty case, as binding precedent in the nonadmiralty
context.
  In sum, the doctrine of forum non conveniens neither
originated in admiralty nor has exclusive application
there.  To the contrary, it is and has long been a
doctrine of general application.  Louisiana's refusal to
apply forum non conveniens does not, therefore, work
-material prejudice to [a] characteristic featur[e] of the
general maritime law.-  Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U. S., at 216.

                      B
  Petitioner correctly points out that the decision here
under review produces disuniformity.  As the Fifth
Circuit noted in Ikospentakis v. Thalassic S. S. Agency,
915 F. 2d 176, 179 (1990), maritime defendants -have
access to a forum non conveniens defense in federal
court that is not presently recognized in Louisiana state
courts.-  We must therefore consider whether Louisiana's
rule -interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity-
of maritime law, Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra,
at 216.
  In The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575 (1875), Justice
Bradley, writing for the Court, said of the Article III
provision extending federal judicial power -to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction-:
     -One thing . . . is unquestionable; the Constitution
must have referred to a system of law coextensive
with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country.
It certainly could not have been the intention to
place the rules and limits of maritime law under the
disposal and regulation of the several States, as that
would have defeated the uniformity and consistency
at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a
commercial character affecting the intercourse of the
States with each other or with foreign states.-
By reason of this principle, we disallowed in Jensen the
application of state workers' compensation statutes to
injuries covered by the admiralty jurisdiction.  Later, in
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 163-164
(1920), we held that not even Congress itself could
permit such application and thereby sanction destruction
of the constitutionally prescribed uniformity.  We have
also relied on the uniformity principle to hold that a
State may not require that a maritime contract be in
writing where admiralty law regards oral contracts as
valid, Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U. S. 731 (1961).
  The requirement of uniformity is not, however,
absolute.  As Jensen itself recognized: -[I]t would be
difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just
how far the general maritime law may be changed,
modified, or affected by state legislation.  That this may
be done to some extent cannot be denied.-  244 U. S., at
216.  A later case describes to what breadth this -some
extent- extends:
-It is true that state law must yield to the needs of
a uniform federal maritime law when this Court
finds inroads on a harmonious system[,] [b]ut this
limitation still leaves the States a wide scope.
State-created liens are enforced in admiralty.  State
remedies for wrongful death and state statutes
providing for the survival of actions . . . have been
upheld when applied to maritime causes of
action. . . . State rules for the partition and sale of
ships, state laws governing the specific performance
of arbitration agreements, state laws regulating the
effect of a breach of warranty under contracts of
maritime insurance-all these laws and others have
been accepted as rules of decision in admiralty
cases, even, at times, when they conflicted with a
rule of maritime law which did not require uniform-
ity.-  Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U. S. 354, 373-374 (1959) (footnotes
omitted).
  It would be idle to pretend that the line separating
permissible from impermissible state regulation is
readily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence, or
indeed is even entirely consistent within our admiralty
jurisprudence.  Compare Kossick, supra (state law cannot
require provision of maritime contract to be in writing),
with Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348
U. S. 310 (1955) (state law can determine effect of
breach of warranty in marine insurance policy).
Happily, it is unnecessary to wrestle with that difficulty
today.  Wherever the boundaries of permissible state
regulation may lie, they do not invalidate state rejection
of forum non conveniens, which is in two respects quite
dissimilar from any other matter that our opinions have
held to be governed by federal admiralty law: it is
procedural rather than substantive, and it is most
unlikely to produce uniform results.
  As to the former point: At bottom, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens is nothing more or less than a
supervening venue provision, permitting displacement of
the ordinary rules of venue when, in light of certain
conditions, the trial court thinks that jurisdiction ought
to be declined.  But venue is a matter that goes to
process rather than substantive rights-determining
which among various competent courts will decide the
case.  Uniformity of process (beyond the rudimentary
elements of procedural fairness) is assuredly not what
the law of admiralty seeks to achieve, since it is sup-
posed to apply in all the courts of the world.  Just as
state courts, in deciding admiralty cases, are not bound
by the venue requirements set forth for federal courts in
the United States Code, so also they are not bound by
the federal common-law venue rule (so to speak) of
forum non conveniens.  Because the doctrine is one of
procedure rather than substance, petitioner is wrong to
claim support from our decision in Pope & Talbot, Inc.
v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406 (1953), which held that Pennsyl-
vania courts must apply the admiralty rule that contrib-
utory negligence is no bar to recovery.  The other case
petitioner relies on, Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co.,
317 U. S. 239, 248-249 (1942), held that the traditional
maritime rule placing the burden of proving the validity
of a release upon the defendant pre-empts state law
placing the burden of proving invalidity upon the
plaintiff.  In earlier times, burden of proof was regarded
as -procedural- for choice-of-law purposes such as the
one before us here, see, e.g., Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass.
600, 124 N. E. 477 (1919); Restatement of Conflict of
Laws 595 (1934).  For many years, however, it has
been viewed as a matter of substance, see Cities Service
Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208, 212 (1939)-which is
unquestionably the view that the Court took in Garrett,
stating that the right of the plaintiff to be free of the
burden of proof -inhered in his cause of action,- -was a
part of the very substance of his claim and cannot be
considered a mere incident of a form of procedure.-  317
U. S., at 249.  Unlike burden of proof (which is a sort
of default rule of liability) and affirmative defenses such
as contributory negligence (which eliminate liability),
forum non conveniens does not bear upon the substan-
tive right to recover, and is not a rule upon which
maritime actors rely in making decisions about primary
conduct-how to manage their business and what
precautions to take.
  But to tell the truth, forum non conveniens cannot
really be relied upon in making decisions about second-
ary conduct-in deciding, for example, where to sue or
where one is subject to being sued.  The discretionary
nature of the doctrine, combined with the multifarious-
ness of the factors relevant to its application, see the
quotation from Gilbert, supra, at 4-5, make uniformity
and predictability of outcome almost impossible.  -The
forum non conveniens determination,- we have said, -is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.  It
may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse
of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant
public and private interest factors, and where its
balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision
deserves substantial deference.-  Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U. S., at 257.  We have emphasized that
-`[e]ach case turns on its facts'- and have repeatedly
rejected the use of per se rules in applying the doctrine.
Id., at 249; Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut.
Casualty Co., 330 U. S., at 527.  In such a regime, one
can rarely count on the fact that jurisdiction will be
declined.

                      C
  What we have concluded from our analysis of admir-
alty law in general is strongly confirmed by examination
of federal legislation.  While there is an established and
continuing tradition of federal common lawmaking in
admiralty, that law is to be developed, insofar as
possible, to harmonize with the enactments of Congress
in the field.  Foremost among those enactments in the
field of maritime torts is the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App.
688.
  That legislation, which establishes a uniform federal
law that state as well as federal courts must apply to
the determination of employer liability to seamen,
Garrett, supra, at 244, incorporates by reference -all
statutes of the United States modifying or extending the
common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury
to railway employees.-  46 U. S. C. App. 688(a).
Accordingly, we have held that the Jones Act adopts
-the entire judicially developed doctrine of liability-
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 35
Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. 51 et seq.  Kernan
v. American Dredging Co., 355 U. S. 426, 439 (1958).
More particularly, we have held that the Jones Act
adopts the -uniformity requirement- of the FELA,
requiring state courts to apply a uniform federal law.
Garrett, supra, at 244.  And-to come to the point of
this excursus-despite that uniformity requirement we
held in Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340
U. S. 1, 5 (1950), that a state court presiding over an
action pursuant to the FELA -should be freed to decide
the availability of the principle of forum non conveniens
in these suits according to its own local law.-  We
declared forum non conveniens to be a matter of -local
policy,- id., at 4, a proposition well substantiated by the
local nature of the -public factors- relevant to the forum
non conveniens determination.  See Reyno, supra, at 241,
and n. 6 (quoting Gilbert, 330 U. S., at 509).
  We think it evident that the rule which Mayfield
announced for the FELA applies as well to the Jones
Act, which in turn supports the view that maritime
commerce in general does not require a uniform rule of
forum non conveniens.  Amicus Maritime Law Associa-
tion of the United States argues that -whether or not it
is appropriate to analogize from FELA to the Jones Act,
Mayfield cannot save the result below because the
Louisiana statute abolishes the forum non conveniens
doctrine in all maritime cases, not just those arising
under the Jones Act.-  Brief for Maritime Law Associa-
tion as Amicus Curiae 16.  It is true enough that the
Mayfield rule does not operate ex proprio vigore beyond
the field of the FELA and (by incorporation) the Jones
Act.  But harmonization of general admiralty law with
congressional enactments would have little meaning if
we were to hold that, though forum non conveniens is a
local matter for purposes of the Jones Act, it is never-
theless a matter of global concern requiring uniformity
under general maritime law.  That is especially so in
light of our recognition in McAllister v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 357 U. S., at 224-225, that, for practical
reasons, a seaman will almost always combine in a
single action claims for relief under the Jones Act and
general maritime law.  It would produce dissonance
rather than harmony to hold that his claims for unsea-
worthiness and maintenance and cure, but not his Jones
Act claim, could be dismissed for forum non conveniens.
  The Jones Act's treatment of venue lends further
support to our conclusion.  In Bainbridge v. Merchants
& Miners Transportation Co., 287 U. S. 278, 280-281
(1932), we held that although 46 U. S. C. App. 688(a)
contains a venue provision, -venue [in Jones Act cases
brought in state court] should . . . [be] determined by
the trial court in accordance with the law of the state.-
The implication of that holding is that venue under the
Jones Act is a matter of judicial housekeeping that has
been prescribed only for the federal courts.  We noted
earlier that forum non conveniens is a sort of superven-
ing venue rule-and here again, what is true for venue
under the Jones Act should ordinarily be true under
maritime law in general.  What we have prescribed for
the federal courts with regard to forum non conveniens
is not applicable to the States.

                  *   *   *
  Amicus the Solicitor General has urged that we limit
our holding, that forum non conveniens is not part of the
uniform law of admiralty, to cases involving domestic
entities.  We think it unnecessary to do that.  Since the
parties to this suit are domestic entities it is quite
impossible for our holding to be any broader.
  The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is

Affirmed.